Anonymity and Severity Analysis for Data Leakeage Detection

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*Abstract*— The number of records that were compromised often measures the severity of a data breach. Organizations may monitor for data leakages and provide alerts on certain criteria. Specifying alert criteria can help a company better utilize its time and resources. Providing data models to measure the severity of leakages can aid in the detection process. Severity can be based on many factors and should consider how much an attacker can infer about a subject from the leaked data. This work proposes an extension of L-Severity called KL-Severity. KL-Severity improves the accuracy and flexibility of L-Severity by considering well-represented sensitive values and other attribute classifications. An analysis of the used privacy metrics in this research was conducted. *(Abstract)*

Keywords-Data Leakage Detection, Privacy Enhancing Technology

# Introduction

Ponemon Institute performed a study in 2016 involving 383 companies from 12 different countries. The research found that there has been a 29% increase in in the total cost of a data breach, reaching an average of $4 million. Each record has an average cost of $158. The healthcare industry had the highest cost of $355 per record. Data is growing at a rapid pace, .5% of all data is analyzed and this amount is decreasing. [trend] To address the growing data, technology is changing and more investments in modern data infrastructure are being made. The investments are to improve data analytics, which includes real-time data processing and visualization. As data increases and technology advances, so will the variety and severity of attacks. Privacy and sensitivity of all attributes will contribute to the severity of a data breach. The cost for an organization to be prepared for a breach is fixed. The increase per person that an organization spends on security has gone up 15% since 2013. This cost can be attributed to investments in resources and Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) technologies. The quicker an organization can respond to a breach will reduce its negative impacts. Stronger data governance, hiring a CISO, having an incident response and business continuity plan can help detect and mitigate data breaches. Leakages caused by cyber criminals are more expensive and harder to detect than those caused by system or human errors.

Regulations have been increased to protect the confidentiality of users. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) handles information and network security throughout the European Union (EU). Guidelines set by ENISA are to Prepare, Detect, Notify and Respond to a security incident. [enisa] Accuracy and severity must be measured when handling confidential user information. Data must remain anonymous and privacy preserving techniques should be applied. Obtaining user consent when handling sensitive data may be required. Data handling must be done with intent to fulfill a purpose.

**Many** variables are involved when measuring the severity of a data breach. The criticality of the data can be determined on sector-based analysis. For example, a breach of confidential data of an organization can negatively impact their stock price. [business] [Biz] et al. saw a 5% decrease in stock price when a company is a victim of a confidential data breach. Data breaches not involving confidential information had no effect. Organizations lost 2.1% of their market value within a timespan of 2 days from disclosure. [CHECK business]

The number of records and cost has a positive correlation. However, the severity of what was leaked may vary. For example, one might argue that the disclosure of a specific disease can impact their lives more negatively than others if disclosed. Those with expertise within their industry must define the labeling of attributes for a given domain. Vavilis et al. created data models with certain assumptions such as a disease like HIV can have a major impact on the life of a subject if the data was disclosed. The severity of the disease increased as well as its medication to treat it. The medication received a high severity score because it can be used to infer the disease of a subject. ­­­­­­­­­­­­Severity is commonly measured by the number of records have been leaked. The ability to identify an individual is taken into consideration of a breach’s severity. The impact of a data leakage on an individual’s life is assumed to outweigh the number of records that was leaked when measuring severity in this research. For example, 10 records that reveal patients have the cold may be considered less severe than 5 records that reveal patients with HIV. Existing conditions when a leak occurred may also impact severity. Records leaked maliciously can remain undetected longer, which increases the impact on an organization. Other factors that increase severity are linkages and the frequency of being a victim to an attack. Linkages are the relationships that are publically available that can be used to reveal sensitive information. This research analyzes the impact of different privacy metrics on the severity of a data leakage. KL-Severity, a model of weighing different data classifications is proposed.

# Previous Work

## K Anonymity

Sweeney et al. proposed K-Anonymity, which requires quasi-identifier values occur at least k number of times within a Q-Block. A q-block is a grouping of tuples that will have the same values for their quasi-identifier attributes. Quasi-identifier attributes can be used in combination to reveal a unique entity.87% of individuals can be identified by their 5-digit zip code, gender and date of birth. [Sweeney]K-anonymity protects against inference and linkage attacks. Sensitive attributes can be breached through unintended disclosures. Data that is retrieved in a single query may not violate the K-Anonymity rule. However, when the data is combined with other queries, it may reveal sensitive attributes Often generalized data is released and unintentionally discloses information about individuals. Inference attacks may involve linking attributes to other data sources. The government and medical industries commonly release information containing attributes unaware of other related data sources. Security of data can protect against a direct data breach, but not from information leaked through inference.

Attacks and vulnerabilities on privacy are not new within the security community. For example, statistical databases are released to provide data for research in data mining or fraud detection. A technique to generalize the data involves adding noise, which can damage the integrity of the information. Multi-level databases (MDB) store data in different classifications. Data is divided into higher and lower classified information. A vulnerability that can be found is when lower classified information is used to infer higher classified records. A way to mitigate this vulnerability is through strong database design. However, the replication of data after a generalized table is released poses a risk. Data that leaves the original source can be copied and manipulated many times after. There is little to no control over the handling of the data once the data has reached multiple receivers. To avoid this vulnerability, all sensitive data can be suppressed, but this technique can leave the data useless.

K-Anonymity is susceptible to different attacks. An unsorted matching attack occurs when positions of the tuples in each generalized table match the private table. To prevent this attack, randomly sorting the data is necessary. Complementary released table vulnerability is when two generalized tables form a linked table. The linked table is used to combine quasi-identifier values to uniquely identify rows in the private table. The complementary released table vulnerability can be addressed by using the quasi-identifiers of the original table. Another technique is to base the new generalized table after the original table that was released. When basing the new generalized table from the original table, no value should be more specific than the values in the original table. For example, if the original table generalized their zip codes to 0213\*, the new table should not be more specific with 02139. The final attack that Sweeney et al. acknowledges is the temporal attack. Temporal attacks occur when new data is added to the private table over time and a new generalized table is released. Linking the original released table with the newly released table can reveal unique rows. A way to avoid this is to base the newly released table on the original released table including the newly added information.

## L-Diversity

**Ashwin** Machanavajjhala et al. presents two attacks on *k*-anonymity, homogeneity attack and background information. An attacker can discover sensitive attributes when the data is not diverse enough. A homogeneity attack leaks information due to the lack of diversity in the sensitive attribute. An attacker may have background knowledge, which can be used to infer sensitive attributes. Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al. proposed Bayes-Optimal and L-Diversity. Bayes optimal is an algorithm that works under the assumption that the data publisher and adversary know the complete distribution set of sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. L-diversity provides privacy without the data publisher knowing how much background information an adversary may have. Although Bayes optimal covers a wider scope, it is not practical in use. It is unlikely that the adversary and data publisher have the complete knowledge of the sets of sensitive and non-sensitive attributes.

Each block of quasi-identifier groups, q-blocks, should have at least L frequency of sensitive attributes. The frequency of sensitive attributes can protect against knowledge an attacker may know. Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al. proposes two algorithms to define well representation of sensitive values called Entropy and Recursive L-Diversity. Entropy diversity ensures that each q-block has well represented groups of sensitive attributes. The more uniform a q-block is, the higher the entropy. Recursive diversity is an algorithm that measures the frequency, but is implemented differently. Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al. proposes other algorithms to handle non-sensitive attributes, which involve variations of entropy and recursive diversity.

A q-block is considered (c, 2)-diverse if the frequency of the most occurring sensitive value is less than c \* the most the sum of the remaining frequencies. Let *r* represent the frequency of an attribute.

## A Severity-based Quantificaiton of Data Le­­­­­­akages in Database Systems

The M-Score calculates a severity metric, but has limitations. For example, to calculate the M-Score a Raw Record Score (RRS) is needed. The RRS has a maximum of 1 and the row with the highest RRS is used as the Final Record Score (RS). The RS is then used to derive the M-Score. In order to calculate the RS, there is a Distinguishing Factor (DF) that the RRS is multiplied by. Although not explicitly stated in the paper, DF is set to a constant .5. The M-Score was then calculated against 3 different cases. Case 1.x[[1]](#footnote-1) exposed the min and max limitations and Case 3.x shows although the leaked table in case 3.2 had less records, the diseases overall were more severe. To accommodate this, L-Severity was proposed. L-Severity will aggregate the node sensitivity of each sensitive attribute per row.

**Raw Record Score:** S is the set of sensitive attributes.

**Distinguishing Factor:**  Is the number of quasi-attributes within the row. Quasi attributes are attributes that are pre-defined and can be used to identify an entity by linking it to other sources.

**Final Record Score:**  Represents the source table.

**M-Score:**  Represents the number of leaked records. Variable x is defined by an analyst and influences the impact of the number of rows that was leaked.

**Record Sensitivity:** NS Represents the Node Sensitivity that is defined in the domain’s data model.

**L-Severity:** For each leaked row, aggregate the record sensitivity.

Table 1 Score Matrix

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Case | L-Severity | M-Score | | |
|
| *x*=1 | *x*=10 | *x*=100 |
|
| Case 1.1 Case 1.1 | 1.700 2.900 | 2.000 2.000 |  |  |
|
| Case 2.1 Case 2.2 | 1.150 2.100 | 2.000 2.000 |
|
| Case 3.1 Case 3.2 | 1.950 2.900 | 3.500 2.000 | 0.607 0.574 | 0.509 0.507 |
|

Table 1 shows the result matrix of M-Score against L-Severity with different values of x. X is only applicable to M-Score. Case 3.1 and 3.2 have different results, L-Severity scores the table in case 3.2 having a higher sensitivity score than what was given in M-Score, .507. Therefore, L-Severity takes account the severity of the entire table and is not limited by the min or max values in M-Score.

## M-score: A misuseability Weight Measure

The M-Score requires sensitivity functions to be defined by domain experts. M-Score was developed to provide a measurement of misuse. Harel et al. describes four dimensions of what they refer to as misuseability; number of entities, anonymity, number of properties and their values.

# Analysis

K-Anonymity and L-Diversity provide rules to prevent disclosing any sensitive information. These rules, to the best of our knowledge, has not included in any severity metrics. L-Severity uses a distinguishing factor, but does not continue. No analysis has been done on the impact of different privacy metrics on the L-Severity score. L-Severity takes into consideration only sensitive attributes when creating sensitivity scores. We propose KL-Diversity that expands on the L-Severity model to include different types of data classifications and to attach a weight to each set. The weight attached to a classification set will allow for more detailed analysis. For example, if we want to place a stronger emphasis on the quasi-identifier attributes, we can increase the weight of that **attribute**.

Quasi-identifier values can impact the severity of a data leakage. For example, a leakage involving diseases can have different impacts on individuals at certain stages of their lives. For example, a 96 year old with HIV is included in a data breach, which reveals his or her disease to the public. Disclosure of a disease can have varying consequences. Privacy of a minor is critical and it may be considered that information involving a minor may be more critical. Using L-Severity model only sensitive attributes are considered without any separation from quasi-identifiers or non-sensitive attributes. Non-sensitive attributes may be misclassified and can give more information than intended. Therefore, attaching a constant score for any added attribute can be beneficial when detecting for data leaks. A caveat of scoring severity is that the domain of these attributes and classifications must be maintained. If an attribute is misclassified an attac­­­­­­­­ker can target non-sensitive attributes to prevent detection. Tracking transactions within an application can alert an organization at the time a possible breach has occurred. A breach may go undetected until a victim reports a problem or an attacker advertises the data on the black market. **A DLP** may be tracking when sensitive data is released or based on some measurement of severity. Severity is complex and can involve many dimensions that are shared or specific to an industry. However, there are few a publications that focus strictly on the severity of only the data and the definitions of the impact of values for sensitive, quasi-identifier and non-sensitive attributes. Vavilis et al. created a model to quantify severity by attaching severity scores to values within a sensitive domain. L-Severity does not separate different classifications of the data. We propose a model that is more scalable allowing emphasis on other attribute classifications.

Giving a constant score to non-sensitive attributes can be useful when reading unstructured data. For example, an API can accept JSON objects that may have varying properties. Due to the unstructured format that the data can come in, unexpected attributes may be passed. Depending on how this data is used, extra information may be leaked or accidentally disclosed to an unauthorized user. An example could be a data dump of values that need to be emailed to another group or data that is passed into another system. This can cause system errors, rejections and leakages.

The comparison of the impact of the Dependency Factor (DF) in L-Severity was done against k-anonymity. This research did not find a significant impact on the severity when alternating algorithms. For example, if a table is conforming to k-anonymity the DF can also remain constant when. Having a higher DF metric will reduce the severity of a row. However, a higher DF score does not guarantee that a leaked table conforms to the k-anonymity rule. In order for a record to follow the *k-anonymity* rule, it must be part of a group of records that is at least *k* in size. After our analysis of M-Score’s DF metric and *k-anonymity* it was concluded that they are almost equivalent on the impact of the severity score. *K-anonymity* is a good baseline for measuring privacy within a generalized dataset. We attempted to measure the impact of considering how far off a group of records were from being conforming with *k.* The farther the number of unique quasi-identifiers a group of records is from *k,* the higher the severity will be. This correlates with a lower DF metric. For example, if there is only 1 distinguished record out of *n* records, *n/1* is greater than *n/k.* Assuming that *k* is larger than 1, this will result in a higher severity for a given record. Future research should be done on the impact of using *l-diversity*. [Sweeney] *L-diversity* provides privacy without knowledge of what the attacker may know. For example, the attacker may have strong background knowledge of the data.

**Having** the capability to attach weights to different classifications allows for more detailed analysis. For example, it is possible to weigh privacy higher than other data classifications. Classifications can include the traditional sensitive, quasi-identifier and non-sensitive attributes or attributes that are specific to an industry. Normal traffic of an application or system must be defined. Vavillis et al. use examples where data is being queried from a system. The regular use of the system should be defined so when high volumes or sensitive information is being retrieved the information can be flagged and raise an alert to the proper party. DLP technology is correlated with organizations have teams to prevent data theft. [mcafee] McAfee performed a study where 64% of security professional within firms that experienced a data breach agreed that the breach could have been prevented if their firm used DLP technology. DLP technology is a top tool in detecting insider threats. A tool that detects the severity of data being retrieved can be helpful when investigating security events.

Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al. presented two attacks to perform on *k*-anonymous tables. A homogeneity attack can be mitigated by having l-diversified sensitive values for each q-block. With a well-diversified table, an data publisher can still provide privacy with the threat of multiple adversaries with different levels of background knowledge. We present a DivFactor to include in the L-Severity equation. The DivFactor will provide a better metric for providing an accurate severity score.

# Conclusion

The importance of data leakage prevention is relevant in today’s media and influences how we use and ingest data on a day-to-day basis. Previous work shows an emphasis on finding a severity metric that takes account of the entire table. However, the result can be impacted by privacy metrics such as the distinguishing factor. Providing security metrics at a database level is beneficial, but having the option to do so at an application level can be more robust. A timeline of events that will take place until the project is completed has been presented. Challenges that are expected is finding, interpreting and attempting to create an improvement based on the privacy metrics that will be used in this research. Designing and creating a proof of concept for the application will be challenging due to time constraints. Future work can focus on applying the proof of concept in an experimental setting or attempting to measure the severity of modifications on sensitive data.

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1. X represents cases 1 and 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)